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COMMENTS
POLITICAL SPEECH IN THE
NONPUBLIC FORUM:
CAN PUBLIC HOUSING FACILITIES
LIMIT ACCESS TO POLITICAL
CANVASSERS?
The freedom to canvass a neighborhood with political leaflets
or to stand in the middle of a public park to speak your mind is a
right that most people cherish in America and a right that is gener-
ally protected by the First Amendment.1 The Supreme Court
stated more than half a century ago that "the authors of the First
Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might dis-
turb the complacent, but they chose to encourage freedom ... this
freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily
protects the right to receive it.,' 2
Yet, there are limits to an individual's right to free speech.
For example, in Miller v. California,3 the Supreme Court declared
that "obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment."4
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,5 the Court formulated the incitement test,
whereby speech that incited illegal conduct would not be protected
by the First Amendment. 6 In addition to limits on the kinds of
speech, freedom of speech is limited by location. For instance,
there is generally no right to freedom of speech on private prop-
erty, including such places as a private residence or a shopping
See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
2 Id. at 143 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1937)).
3 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4 Id. at 36.
5 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
6 Id. at 447 ("[tlhe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action").
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mall.7 If an individual's presence is not welcome or his speech is
not desired, generally he can be arrested for trespassing on private
property, regardless of his First Amendment rights to free speech.8
Currently, many public housing facilities limit access to only
residents, invited guests and those conducting official business. 9
Anyone found in violation of this policy is excluded under "tres-
pass after warning" statutes' ° which prohibit persons from entering
or remaining on property after receiving a trespass warning.1" This
exclusion effectively limits political activists' access to public
housing because activists are neither residents nor invited guests,
and they are not conducting official business for the housing au-
thority.12  Thus, political canvassers who wish to go door to door
to distribute information about candidates or causes are turned
away or arrested if they enter the housing facilities property and
remain there after being asked to leave.
The extent of an individual's right to free speech in govern-
ment owned public housing facilities has never been fully decided
by the courts. 13 The First Amendment does not guarantee access to
property simply because it is owned by the government,14 yet the
government "when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not en-
joy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints.' 5  Only
two circuit courts of appeals have decided the issue of whether
political activists can be excluded from public housing facilities;
those courts have come to different conclusions. The Eleventh
7 The only cases discussing the right to use private property for speech purposes involved
claims that private shopping centers were, in essence, public forums. For example, see Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968),
which held that the town shopping center was the functional equivalent of a business district.
The Supreme Court has also held that privately owned shopping centers can exclude protesters
from distributing leaflets. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (stating that prop-
erty does not lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for
designated purposes).
8 The Court held that there had not been such a dedication of Lloyd's private property to
public use as to entitle persons to exercise their First Amendment rights. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at
570.
9 See, e.g., Hous. Auth., City of El Paso, Community and Resident Rules for Public
Housing, Rule D2 (2000).
10 See FLA. STAT. ch. 810.09 (2000) (stating that those who enter property without au-
thorization from the owner and remain on the property after being asked to leave are guilty of a
misdemeanor).
1 Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546,548 (11th Cir. 1994).
12 See Hous. Auth., City of El Paso, Community Rules for Public Housing, Section 8 New
Construction Program, Rule D (2000). The El Paso Housing Authority includes the following
persons as performing "official" duties: law enforcement and other government personnel, util-
ity service workers, HACEP contractors, and others authorized by HACEP. Id.
13 See Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the di-
rect conflict between its decision and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Daniel).
14 United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
15 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990).
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that the exclusion of political can-
vassers under Florida's trespass after warning statute was content
neutral and reasonable, and therefore did not violate the First
Amendment.' 6 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently held that such exclusion was an unreasonable restriction on
the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. 17
This Comment argues that the wholesale exclusion of political
canvassers from public housing facilities under trespass after
warning statutes is not reasonable and thus violates the First
Amendment. Part I reviews the Supreme Court's forum analysis to
determine the constitutionality of a governmental regulation of
speech within its own property. Part II examines the two cases
that have decided whether the First Amendment protects the rights
of political activists to distribute literature and information in pub-
lic housing developments. Part III discusses whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Martin v. City of Struthers18 provides guidance
on this issue. Lastly, Part IV discusses other Supreme Court cases
that have limited the free speech rights of individuals on govern-
ment owned property and distinguishes public housing facilities
from the government owned properties where regulation has taken
place.
1. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT'S FORUM
ANALYSIS
A. Historical Implications
The right to use government property for speech purposes was
not always a constitutionally protected right. The Supreme Court
in 1897 upheld a Boston ordinance that prohibited any public ad-
dress on publicly owned property. 19 The Court concluded that the
government had an absolute right to exclude, and that the right to
exclude encompassed the right to determine under what circum-
stances government property could be used for speech purposes.2°
Forty years later, the Court recognized the right of individuals
to use government property for speech purposes.2' In Schneider v.
16 Daniel, 38 F.3d at 550.
17 Vasquez, 271 F.3d at 206.
18 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
19 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
20 Id. ("The right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the authority
to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power con-
tains the lesser.").
21 See Hauge v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. N.J., 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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New Jersey,2 2 the Court held that a city ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it prohibited the distribution of leaflets on city
streets and alleys2 3 The Court stated that "streets are natural and
proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion;
and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."24 Thus, the Court ruled that cities must allow
speech in public places like city streets2 5
B. The Supreme Court's Forum Analysis
Although Schneider held that city streets could not be closed
to canvassers, it did not distinguish between the types of govern-
ment property that would be available for speech purposes and
those that could constitutionally be closed.26 The Court, in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,
27
ultimately classified the different types of government property
that would be open for speech.28  In Perry, teachers in a school
district union had allowed their collective bargaining representa-
tive to use the school mail system. Another rival teachers' union
wanted to use the mail system as well, claiming that since other
groups had access to the system that it should be able to use it as
well. 29 The Court upheld the exclusion of the rival teachers' un-
ion, and created a classification system that described the various
"forums," and formulated tests for each forum to determine
whether speech could be allowed or excluded.3°
The Court created three forums: public, designated public,
and nonpublic.31 Public forums are government properties that the
government must make available for speech. 32 Traditional exam-
ples of public forums are parks and sidewalks.33 The government
22 308 U.S. at 147.
23 Id. at 162 (stating that the purpose of keeping streets clean and in good appearance is
insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully, on a public street, from
distributing literature to one who wishes to receive it).
24 Id. at 163.
25 Id. at 165. The Court also held that "we are not to be taken as holding that commercial
solicitation and canvassing may not be subjected to regulation as the ordinance requires." Id.
Further, the decision stated that towns might fix reasonable hours when individuals may can-
vass. Id.
26 Id.
27 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
28 Id. at 45-46.
29 Id. at 40-41.
30 Id. at 45-47.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 45. This type of land has "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public." Id.
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may regulate speech in public forums only in certain circum-
stances. For a state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest, and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.34 The
state may also enforce regulations of time, place, and manner of
expression that are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.35
Designated public forums are places that the government
could close to speech, but the government has voluntarily
opened.36 A school or university that opens itself in the evenings
and on weekends to community groups is a designated public fo-
rum. Once the government or school district chooses to open the
school to speech, it must comply with all of the same rules that
govern public forums.37
Nonpublic forums are government properties that the govern-
ment can close to all speech activities, or "[p]ublic property which
is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communica-
tion., 38 The government may prohibit or restrict speech in non-
public forums so long as the regulation is reasonable and is view-
point neutral. 39  Examples of nonpublic forums include military
bases, prisons, and post offices.
This Comment proceeds under the assumption that public
housing complexes are nonpublic forums. Unlike a park, public
housing was created to provide affordable housing for its resi-
dents. 40  Such facilities are not "'by tradition or designation a fo-
rum for public communication. ' '' 41 Thus, under the Supreme
Court's forum analysis, any restriction on speech within nonpublic
forums must be content neutral and reasonable.42
4 Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
35 Id. at 46 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981)). See Clark v.
Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1983). The Court stated that overnight sleep-
ing in connection with a demonstration in a Washington park was expressive conduct protected
by the First Amendment, yet it still upheld the Park Service's regulation against overnight sleep-
ing as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Id.
36 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The Court did state that reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations would be permissible, and that a content based prohibition must be narrowly drawn
to effectuate a compelling government purpose. Id.
37 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
38 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
39 Id.
40 Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 2001).
41 Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11 th Cir. 1994) (quoting Crowder v. Hous.
Auth., 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11 th Cir. 1993)).
42 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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II. CASES INTERPRETING WHETHER PUBLIC HOUSING
AUTHORITIES CAN CONSTITUTIONALLY LIMIT HOUSING AUTHORITY
RESIDENTS' ACCESS TO POLITICAL SPEECH
A. Daniel v. City of Tampa
Anthony Mark Daniel was issued a trespass warning in 1991
and was arrested for violating Florida's trespass after warning
statute on three separate occasions. 3 On one occasion, Daniel was
arrested after entering Housing Authority property in order to post
a sign on a tree protesting the United State's involvement in the
Persian Gulf War. On two other occasions Daniel was arrested for
distributing leaflets to residents. He filed suit alleging that his ar-
rests violated both his First Amendment rights to canvass door-to-
door and the Housing Authority tenants' right to receive informa-
tion.44
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute
did not violate Daniel's First Amendment rights.45 The court con-
cluded, in a short opinion, that enforcement of the statute was a
reasonable means of combating crime because "enforcement of the
statute has decreased the number of non-residents engaging in
criminal activity on Housing Authority property., 46 Further, the
Daniel court stated that political activists have unlimited access to
city owned streets and sidewalks adjacent to the housing complex
that provided alternative means for distributing information to
residents. 47 Therefore, the appellate court held that Daniel's ar-
rests for violating Florida's trespass after warning statute did not
violate his First Amendment rights.48
B. Vasquez v. Housing Authority
Robert Vasquez was a candidate for the El Paso County De-
mocratic Chair in El Paso, Texas. 49 He sought to distribute litera-
ture and engage in door-to-door campaigning at Sherman Oaks, a
housing unit owned by the Housing Authority of the City of El
Paso ("HACEP"). 50 HACEP informed Vasquez that he could not
campaign on any housing authority property, citing a rule that lim-
43 Daniel, 38 F.3d at 548-49.
44 id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 550. The Court stated that housing property was often used by non-residents as a
place to sell and use drugs. Id. at 548.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198, 201-02 (5th Cir. 2001).
50 Id.
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ited access to "residents, members of their households, their guests
and visitors, and such other persons who have a legitimate busi-
ness on the premises.,, 51 Further regulations prohibited the distri-
bution of notices and flyers without the prior approval of the de-
52velopment's housing manager. Thus, the regulations allowed
residents to distribute literature but prevented nonresidents from
doing so. 53 Vasquez and Jesus De La 0, a resident of HACEP,
sued claiming the nonresident restriction or "trespass after warn-
ing" policy violated the First Amendment.
54
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regulations,
as applied to political campaigners, constituted an unreasonable
restriction on De La O's First Amendment right to receive political
information. 55 Focusing on reasonableness, the court stated that
"door-to-door political volunteers provide the main or only link to
the election process, especially with respect to local elections,
where candidates may lack the resources for extensive media cov-
erage. ' 56 The Vasquez court concluded by stating that the whole-
sale exclusion of political candidates and their volunteers "unrea-
sonably and unnecessarily interferes with what may well be the
primary connection between many of HACEP's residents and the
democratic process. 57
The dissent, agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit's position in
Daniel, concluded that the restrictions on nonresidents were a rea-
sonable response to the problem of rampant crime in low-income
housing.58 Further, it stressed the fact that alternative channels of
communication existed for residents to receive information, ex-
plaining that all HACEP properties were adjacent to public streets
and sidewalks, and that De La O's complex, Sun Plaza Apart-
ments, was "completely bounded by city streets and sidewalks."
59
In addition, the dissent believed that any resident was free to hear
51 Hous. Auth., Community and Resident Rules for Public Housing, Section 8 New Con-
struction Program, Rule D2 (2000).
52 Id. Rule D5 allowed residents to distribute literature only between 9:00 AM and 8:00
PM and forbid the placing of leaflets on the doors of residents who did not answer.
5- Vasquez, 271 F.3d at 201.
54 Only De La 0 appealed the trial court's decision to grant HACEP summary judgment,
asserting that his constitutional right to receive information from political candidates was vio-
lated. id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 204.
57 Id. at 205.
58 Id. at 207-08.
59 Id. at 208. The dissent also argued that another factor in the evaluation of the overall
reasonableness of a regulation is whether there are alternative channels of communication avail-
able, such as direct mail campaigns. Id.
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the messages of various candidates outside of the complex and was
then free to invite the candidate onto the property.60
III. THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO RECEIVE AND DISTRIBUTE
POLITICAL LEAFLETS
A. Is it Reasonable to Restrict Political Canvassers' Access to
Public Housing? A Look at Martin v. City of Struthers and its Impact
Prior to the Supreme Court's Forum Analysis.
The First Amendment protects the freedom of individuals to
distribute literature and protects the right to receive it.6 I In Martin
v. City of Struthers,62 a case decided prior to the Supreme Court's
forum analysis, the Supreme Court held that the "freedom to dis-
tribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive
it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, put-
ting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and
manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. 63 In Struthers,
Jehovah's Witnesses went to the homes of strangers to distribute
leaflets advertising a religious meeting. For delivering leaflets, a
woman was convicted of violating a local ordinance that stated:
It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars
or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door
knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any
residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such hand-
bills, circulars, or other advertisements they or any person
with them may be distributing.64
The defendant admitted knocking at the door for the purposes
of delivering the invitation but argued that the ordinance violated
the First Amendment.65 The city argued that burglars frequently
posed as canvassers to discover whether a house was empty and
therefore restricting door-to-door activity was constitutional. 66
Struthers ultimately held that the city could not, consistent
with the First Amendment, ban the practice of door-to-door solici-
tation, and that allowing such a practice was up to "the master of
each household, and not upon the determination of the commu-
60 Id.
61 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
62 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
63 Id. at 146-47.
64 id. at 142.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 144 (recognizing that crime prevention may be a valid purpose for regulatory
ordinances).
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nity.,, 67 The Court stated that "while door-to-door distributors of
literature may be either a nuisance or a blind for criminal activi-
ties, they may also be useful members of society engaged in the
dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best tradition of free
discussion., 68 "'Pamphlets have proved most effective instruments
in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective
.way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribu-
tion at the homes of the people.' 69 The Struthers Court believed
that the rights of political canvassers were equally significant, as
the opinion stated that "door to door campaigning is one of the
most accepted techniques of seeking popular support, while the
circulation of nominating papers would be greatly handicapped if
they could not be taken to the citizens in their homes. 7 0 This right
was "essential to the poorly financed causes of the little people."
7 1
In addition to supporting the rights of political canvassers, the
Struthers decision provided further guidance concerning how to
balance the constitutional protections afforded political canvassers
with the protection and safety of residents in a particular commu-
nity.72 The Court stated that identification devices could control
the abuse of criminals posing as canvassers.73 The Vasquez court
struck a very similar balance in its decision, stating that requiring
political campaigners to seek the same authorization as other indi-
viduals that have legitimate business on the premises would be
reasonable in light of public housing facilities goals of preventing
crime by nonresidents.74 Logically, all housing authorities would
have to do is check to make sure that the political canvassers cre-
dentials were valid. Presumably, this is the same type of identifi-
cation check that is done with the cable repairman when he seeks
entrance onto housing property. Thus, the only reasonable way to
balance these two competing interests is to require public housing
facilities to use identification methods as a way to protect the
safety of residents, and not the exclusion of free speech. It does
not seem reasonable, with such a workable solution, to exclude
political canvassers.
67 Id. at 141.
6 Id. at 145.
69 Id. (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
70 Id. at 146.
71 Id.
72 The Court stated that in this case it was necessary to weigh the conflicting interests of
the leafleter and the individual homeowner's right to receive information against the interests of
the community in protecting residents. Id. at 143.
73 Id. at 148. The Court left this problem of regulation for the communities to figure out.
Id. 7' Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Yet, since Struthers was decided before the Court's forum
analysis and concerned the role of the city in banning speech, its
effect upon the rights of political activists is unclear. The Court,
though, has never overruled Struthers; thus the opinion should be
considered important in determining the level of constitutional
protection that should be afforded to door-to-door canvassers. The
Struthers opinion demonstrates the Court's general adherence to
the protection of those persons who are "not specifically invited to
go from home to home and knock on doors or ring doorbells to
communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them to political,
religious, or other kinds of public meetings. 75
Struthers' general protection of the rights of political canvass-
ers should be applied in the context of the rights of individuals to
canvass and receive information in public housing. It is not rea-
sonable to restrict access under the auspices of protecting the
safety of the residents. This argument was rejected in Struthers
and should be rejected in the context of public housing.76 Further,
Struthers provided an acceptable alternative to restricting access to
all non-residents. By mandating that canvassers check in with the
housing office, the fear of criminal activity, which is the primary
justification for restriction, is virtually eliminated. Though this
type of screening might require some effort on the part of public
housing administration, it would be unreasonable to exclude all
political activity because of the effort that such screening might
require. Further, this same type of screening is already being done
to identify utility workers and others who wish to "legitimately"
enter public housing property.
B. The Supreme Court's Restriction of Speech in the Nonpublic
Forum: Is the Restriction of Speech in Public Housing Reasonable in
Light of Other Decisions?
Recognizing that Struthers was decided in a very different pe-
riod in American history, it is important to look at the cases that
have been decided under the nonpublic forum test to determine
where public housing facilities fit those criteria. In general, the
Supreme Court has limited the rights of individuals to disseminate
and receive information in nonpublic forums.77 The Court has held
that restrictions limiting solicitation at airports to areas outside the
75 Struthers, 319 U.S. at 141.
76 Id. at 147 (believing that the dangers of distribution could easily be controlled by tradi-
tional legal methods, the Court left to each homeowner the full right to decide whether he will
receive strangers as visitors).
77 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1995); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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terminal are constitutional,7 8 that restrictions on protesters on jail-
house grounds are constitutional, 79 and that since postal sidewalks
are not a public forum, regulations prohibiting solicitors are con-
stitutional.8°
Restrictions limiting solicitation at airports were found to be
reasonable because of the delay and inconvenience involved; re-
strictions on speech on jailhouse property were found to be consti-
tutional because of the need to maintain safety and order; and re-
strictions on solicitation at postal facilities were found to be rea-
sonable because of the disrupted flow of postal business. 81 In each
of these cases, the operation of commerce was effected, or the op-
eration and security of the prison system was involved.82 These
restrictions seem reasonable. Airports and post offices are places
where official business takes place. Prisons house America's dan-
gerous and violent criminals. In contrast, public housing facilities
are people's homes, places where families discuss political ideas at
the dinner table. The wholesale exclusion of political canvassers
from public housing is not reasonable in light of the Court's prior
nonpublic forum cases. In addition, the Court has regulated solici-
tation, not distribution of literature.83 Solicitation has been found
to be more intrusive, and thus less protected than distributing lit-
erature.
84
Restricting an individual's right to solicit money at airport
terminals does not violate the First Amendment and should be con-
sidered a reasonable restriction on free speech.85 In International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, the Court held that air-
ports were not traditional public forums and that regulations re-
stricting solicitation were reasonable because they promoted the
airport's interest in crowd control and efficient air travel by limit-
ing solicitation to the areas outside of the airport terminals. 86 In
Krishna, the Port Authority of New York adopted a regulation for-
bidding the repetitive solicitation of money within the airport ter-
minals. 87 The Court noted the "disruptive effect that solicitation
78 Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
79 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
80 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
81 See Krishna, 505 U.S. at 685; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 736-37; Adderley, 385 U.S. at 44-
47.
82 Krishna, 505 U.S. at 674-75; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 723-24; Adderley, 385 U.S. at 40.
83 Krishna, 505 U.S. at 683-84.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 673.
86 Id. at 685.
87 Id. at 674-75.
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may have on business., 88 "The result is that the normal flow of
traffic is impeded. 89  It noted that pedestrian congestion was a
major problem at Port Authority airports, and that the incremental
effects would prove disruptive. Most importantly, the Court ruled
that the ban on the distribution of leaflets alone was unconstitu-
tional.90 It concluded that the ban on leafleting was not reasonable
and thus was impermissible even though the airport was a nonpub-
lic forum.
91
The Court's rationale in Krishna seems reasonable. After all,
the disruption in New York airports could potentially affect com-
merce. There is no similar disruption of commerce found in public
housing facilities, but justifiable concerns do exist over the safety
of residents of public housing. Though this safety concern is rea-
sonable, the wholesale exclusion of political activity is not a rea-
sonable means of combating this fear, whereas banning solicitors
is a reasonable way to relieve the congestion of busy New York
airports. Excluding people from the political process at a busy air-
port is different than excluding people from the political process at
their home. At the airport, people are busy going from point A to
point B. For centuries though, it has been a common practice for
people to go door-to door to communicate ideas.92 In addition, the
Court in Krishna banned solicitation of money, not the distribution
of literature at airports. The distribution of literature was found to
be a constitutionally protected right.93 It seems logical to argue
then, that political volunteers who distribute literature in public
housing and do not solicit campaign contributions should be pro-
tected in light of the Court's decision in Krishna.
The Court has also held that it is a reasonable restriction of
speech for prisons to exclude people from protesting on jailhouse
grounds. 94  In Adderley v. Florida,95 several students were con-
victed of trespassing on jailhouse grounds to protest the arrest of
other students who were being held at the jail.96 The Court held
that the government could prohibit speech in the areas outside
11 Id. at 683-84.
89 Id.
90 The Court reasoned that solicitation requires action by those who would respond and
requires them to reach for a wallet, "search it for money, write a check, or produce a credit
card." Id. at 692.
9' Id. at 690 (noting that leafleting does not pose the same kinds of problems presented by
face to face solicitation).
92 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141 (1943).
93 Krishna, 505 U.S. at 692.
94 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 40.
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prisons and jails, noting that the state has the power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated.97 Rejecting the students' First Amendment claim, Adderley
stated that there was no merit to the petitioners' argument that they
had a constitutionally protected right to stay on the property, even
though the students claimed that the area was chosen for a peaceful
civil rights demonstration.98 The dissent urged that:
The jailhouse, like an executive mansion, a legislative cham-
ber, a courthouse, or the statehouse itself is one of the seats
of government, whether it be the Tower of London, the Bas-
tille, or a small county jail. And when it houses political
prisoners or those who many think are unjustly held, it is an
obvious center for protest.99
Further, the dissent stated that "we do violence to the First
Amendment when we permit this 'petition for redress of griev-
ances' to be turned into a trespass action."' ° Though places like a
Senate gallery may not be the proper place for protest, it should
not simply be up to the custodian of public property to decide
when public places shall be used for the communication of ideas.
"For to place such discretion in any public official ... is to place
those who assert their First Amendment rights at his mercy.
1°
Though the dissent argued fervently that restrictions on free-
dom of speech on jailhouse grounds were unconstitutional, one
could argue that restrictions on speech are reasonable on prison
grounds because prisons are dangerous places and maintaining law
and order is essential. 0 2 Public housing, though sometimes rife
with criminality, is still housing for thousands of citizens across
the country. Restricting speech only serves to stifle the rights of
those residents to learn and disseminate political ideas and activ-
ity.
The Court has also held that restrictions on speech in and
around postal facilities is reasonable in light of the Postal Ser-
vice's mission to provide the most efficient and effective distribu-
tion of the mails. 0 3 In United States v. Kokinda,'°4 members of a
97 Id. at 47.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 49.
100 Id. at 52 (distinguishing between a petition for redress and picketing). The dissent
believed that picketing was a form of protest directed at private interests, while a petition for
redress was a form of protest directed at the state. Id.
10t Id. at 54.
02 The dissent noted that it was undisputed that the entrance to the jail was not blocked
and that the sheriff was able to drive up the driveway of the prison. Id. at 51-52.
103 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990).
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political advocacy group set up a table on a sidewalk near the en-
trance to a United States Post Office to solicit contributions, sell
books and subscriptions to the organization's newspaper, and to
distribute literature on a variety of political issues. 0 5 The Court
held that it was reasonable for the Postal Service to prohibit solici-
tation where it had determined that the intrusion creates a signifi-
cant interference with the mail system, and that the Postal Ser-
vice's concern about losing customers because of the potentially
unpleasant situation created by solicitation was also reasonable.'°6
The disruption of the efficient distribution of the mails and the
loss of Postal Service customers due to people soliciting money in
and around postal facilities is certainly a concern. Like Krishna,
the Court in Kokinda clearly determined that disruption of com-
merce and its inherent effects are serious concerns that justify rea-
sonable restriction of speech. 0 7 Yet, the political organization in-
volved in the Kokinda case was soliciting money as well as dis-
tributing leaflets. The Court stated that "confrontation by a person
asking for money disrupts passage and is more intrusive and in-
timidating than an encounter with a person giving out informa-
tion. ' ' °8 Kokinda does not say whether distribution alone would
disrupt passage and the mail system, but two years later in Krishna
the Court held that the distribution of leaflets at an airport was a
constitutionally protected right.' °9 One might then infer that the
distribution of leaflets alone at a postal facility would be a consti-
tutionally protected right as well. After all, the posting of informa-
tion on postal facilities is a common practice in many communi-
ties.1 '0
Whether the Court would hold that the distribution of leaflets
in a public housing facility is a constitutionally protected right is
unclear. Though the Court has found restrictions on speech rea-
sonable in nonpublic forums, it has held that the prohibitions on
distributions of literature in airports to be unconstitutional. Since
the primary concern of public housing facilities seems to be safety,
the intrusion on the facilities property would seem to be the pri-
I4 Id. at 720.
105 Id. at 723.
106 Id. at 733-34.
107 Id. at 732-33.
108 Id. at 734.
109 Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 690 (1992).
110 See 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(i) (1998) ("The postal service has no intention to discontinue...
that valuable service [of providing for the display of public notices and announcements] to local
communities. The adopted regulation contains ... language insuring that the authority of post-
masters to allow the placement in post office of bulletin boards for the display of public notices
and announcements will continue as before.").
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mary concern, not whether political canvassers are soliciting
money at a resident's door or are simply handing out flyers. Yet,
when reviewing the Court's jurisprudence on nonpublic forums, it
seems clear that in many circumstances there is a constitutional
right to distribute literature in nonpublic forums. After all, both
Kokinda and Krishna found that solicitation, but not distribution of
literature, could be restricted."'
CONCLUSION
The right to distribute and receive information is a fundamen-
tal right under the Constitution. Such a right is most important in
people's homes, where Americans discuss politics and those seek-
ing popular support canvass neighborhoods to circulate petitions or
information. Such a right, in nonpublic forums, cannot be re-
stricted absent a reasonable justification. Crime prevention,
though an important goal in many public housing facilities, cannot
take precedence over the First Amendment rights, especially when
these facilities can easily restrict access to only those genuinely
seeking to disseminate ideas and information. Thus, trespass after
warning statutes, as applied in public housing facilities, should be
held to violate the First Amendment.
CHRISTOPHER D. PELLICCIONI
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Krishna, 505 U.S. at 690; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733-34.
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